Smead Capital Management- The Law of Fashion

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To us at Smead Capital Management, there are some divine laws that govern the stock market over long time periods.

Interest rates are like gravity to P/E ratios (Warren Buffett)

Euphoric episodes end badly (Galbraith)

Cheap stocks outperform expensive stocks over long time periods (Benjamin Graham)

Performance is enhanced by buying extreme pessimism (John Templeton)

Every stock which goes up 10-fold had to double and quadruple first (Smead)

Young people who buy stocks on borrowed money lose (Edwin Lefevre-Reminisces of a Stock Market Operator)

Most investors suffer stock market failure (Dalbar)

Smead Capital Management- The McNealy Problem

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Investors often ask our team at Smead Capital Management what we spend our time on. We believe reading is the best use of our time to learn and think about the way that we can profitably apply capital for our investors. We recently read Ben Inker’s letter from GMO. In the letter was a 2002 quote in Bloomberg from the former Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy. McNealy was explaining ex-ante how irrational the financial euphoria of the late 1990’s was when he said:

2 years ago we were selling at 10 times revenues when we were at $64. At 10 times revenues, to give you a 10-year payback, I have to pay you 100% of revenues for 10 straight years in dividends. That assumes I can get that by my shareholders. That assumes I have zero cost of goods sold, which is very hard for a computer company. That assumes zero expenses, which is really hard with 39,000 employees. That assumes I pay no taxes, which is very hard. And that assumes you pay no taxes on your dividends, which is kind of illegal. And that assumes with zero R&D for the next 10 years, I can maintain the current revenue run rate. Now, having done that, would any of you like to buy my stock at $64? Do you realize how ridiculous those basic assumptions are? You don’t need any transparency. You don’t need any footnotes. What were you thinking?

Smead Capital Management: Quail Pricing in Oil Assets

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On the insistence from a friend and a colleague, I watched the movie There Will Be Blood over the weekend. I’m a Daniel Day Lewis fan from his prior works like Gangs of New York, so was excited to watch this odd story. Lewis’s character Daniel Plainview is a silver speculator turned oilman who comes across an oil opportunity in Little Boston, CA. He takes his son (HW) to a property, owned by the Sunday family, that they are told contains oil. He tells the owner that they are going quail hunting, which wasn’t true. While hunting, HW stumbles upon an oil seepage confirming the oil is present on the land. They are both excited and the following scene ensues with his son:

HW (son): How much we gonna pay them?

Daniel (father): Who’s that?

HW (son): The Sunday Family

Daniel (father): We’re not going to give them oil prices. We’ll give them quail prices.

While we are not claiming to be getting our oil companies for birdfeed, it brings up the idea of distraction for the Sunday family in the movie and investors now. The Sundays had strangers show up looking to hunt quail, not knowing they were looking for oil. Outside of one family member believing there was a ruse, they were willing parties when the sale price was negotiated at what looked like low prices in the movie. These people had never seen oil drilled on their land, thus didn’t understand the opportunity that lied ahead.

Meb Faber: Episode #290: Bill Smead, Smead Capital Management, “There’s Less Respect For Stock Picking Experts Right At This Moment Than There Has Been Since The Peak Of The Dot-Com Bubble”

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In today’s episode, Bill explains why he believes the market is undergoing a tide change. He starts with a look back on the 2000 tech bubble and uses Cisco as an example of why it’s important to separate a good business from a good stock. After talking about parts of the market he doesn’t like, we move on to the parts he finds attractive, including home-builders, energy, suburban mall REITs, and financials. As we wind down, Bill touches on the antitrust case for big tech and what the investment implications may be.

Smead Capital Management: Beating Bobbie Fischer

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During the 1998 Berkshire Hathaway meeting, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger were asked a question about the return-on-equity of American banks. They commented on the topic in a typical Berkshire-like fashion. They then got off on a tangent that provided a truth of biblical proportion.

So it’s not at all clear that if all American management were dramatically better, leaving out the competition against foreign enterprises, that returns on equity would be a lot better. They might very well drive things down. That’s what, to some extent, can easily happen in securities markets. It’s way better to be in securities markets if you have a 100 IQ and everybody else operating has an 80, than if you have 140 and all the rest of them also have 140.

So the secret of life is weak competition, you know. (Laughter)

Somebody said, “How do you beat Bobby Fischer?” You play him in any game except chess.

Smead Capital Management: Vexing Today’s Convex Pricing Behavior

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After getting into our offices around 8:30am Eastern on Monday morning, I was lucky enough to catch an interview with famed short seller Carson Block of Muddy Waters. As expected, CNBC anchor Andrew Ross Sorkin asked about GameStop and short sellers. Block provided his answer, but then went on to say:

…But the bigger issue really is that when you get down to what actually causes this. I’m going to throw something out there that I suspect a vast majority of your listeners have not heard, but a lot of this disfunction is being driven by the prevalence of passive investing. I want to say one thing before questions come my way. Yes, I knew about the robo-bid and I knew that fundamentals are irrelevant to the robo-bid or passive investors. What I didn’t appreciate is that as passive grows in a float that It actually creates convex pricing behavior. It basically becomes the driver of growth and it is in my mind, based on my understanding now, it’s the single biggest explanation for why growth as a style has massively outperformed value. Again, it’s not tied to fundamentals. It’s tied to supply and demand.

Smead Capital Management: Throwing Caution

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As we begin 2021, the investing public is tied up in a “frenzy,” to quote Charlie Munger from a recent interview. This “frenzy” can be captured a couple ways. Whether by the investment banking activities that usually coincide with poor market returns going forward (stock market failure), or by the sell-side research analysts playing hopscotch to raise their price targets over their competition in the most exciting stocks. Rather than look at Wall Street, who can often exact nefarious schemes and ideas on investors, we think it would be best to look at market participants to understand where we sit.

Call buying relative to put buying is at a 20-year high as noted by the chart below. Investors have never been this enthused to speculate in options at any point since 2000. This is Munger’s “frenzy.” They aren’t avoiding caution. As the song says, they’re “throwing caution.” They believe “the winds of change are blowing wild and free.” Individual and institutional investors are telling us stories of what the future will hold and what the market has capitalized. As Marty Whitman would remind us, they’re way too interested in the “going concern” and not interested enough in the balance sheet of these situations. Predicting earnings in the future is tough. Looking at the capital structure of a business is more predictable.

Smead Capital Management: From the Impatient to the Patient

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"The stock market is a device which transfers money from the impatient to the patient.”

—Warren Buffett

As we enter 2021, it appears that Buffett had things upside down in 2020. The things which had gone up the most by the end of 2019, went up the most in 2020. We invest on behalf of clients who want to avoid stock market failure and history shows most investors are impatient and are like a car stalled on the railroad tracks.

Fortunately, it is for these critical junctures in the stock market which disciplines like ours were created. First, we believe valuation matters dearly. It didn’t matter in 2020, in fact, you were better off to buy the most expensive securities carrying the highest possible risk during the year. Historically, valuation is a driver of alpha and usually makes a roaring comeback when a “frenzy” (like Charlie Munger describes today’s stock market) breaks and shifts the capital to those who are patient.

Smead Capital Management: Humility Produces Alpha

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Joe Kennedy was getting his shoes shined in 1929 and the shoeshine boy was giving him stock tips. Think of how humiliating it might have been to Kennedy, who had dramatically reduced his common stock ownership. This upstart had been making money and couldn’t wait to pass along his wisdom to Mr. Kennedy. Joe quickly surmised that there was nobody left to buy stocks and established a huge short position in the stock market. The fortune he made by betting against stocks was part of the wealth which led his son, John F. Kennedy, to become President of the United States in 1960.

We were at our grandkid’s soccer game recently and we struck up a conversation with one of the parents. They worked for a successful fintech company (which we owned for a long time) and explained to us that they had invested in Shopify (SHOP) at around $140 per share. I looked it up over the weekend and was astounded by what the numbers told me.

Smead Capital Management: Energy in the Icahn-ic Green Room

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David Dreman’s book, Contrarian Investment Strategies, was gospel to investors when it was first published in 1979. Investors had been decimated by markets going nowhere over the prior 10 years. Stock investors were ready for something new. Dreman had produced a lot of success as an investor and wanted to share his gospel of contrarian value investing.

The perfect picture of Dreman’s gospel comes from his opening chapter. He refers to the stock market as a casino with a green wing and a red wing. Looking into the green wing, “the atmosphere is unhurried, the blackjack tables are sparsely attended, and every player sits behind a mound of green and black chips.” As he points out, everything is so mundane that “you think you’ve come to the wrong place.” The next thing you notice is the players in the room, “they’re all winning.”

Smead’s Folly Becomes Newsom’s Folly

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We became extremely bearish on energy in 2011. At the time, we saw interest in Seattle for hybrid and electric cars. This convinced us that 10% of the cars on the road nationwide might be hybrid and electric by 2020. In actuality, only 2% of total unit sales in the U.S. were electric vehicles over the last ten years. We also felt back then that the enthusiasm among investors for emerging markets/China was overblown and would cause oil demand forecasts to fall short of expectations.

It turns out we were wrong, because we were too early in our prediction. It wasn’t until 2016, and then more recently with the COVID-19 lockdowns in 2020, that oil prices declined steeply. From the summer of 2014 to the summer of 2019, we benefited from having no participation in the energy sector.